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1A Theory of Discrimination
based on Signalling and Strategic Information Acquisition
Abstract
The paper develops a “signalling” based theory of discrimination where workers
face different incentives for skill acquisition purely because of their group
membership. Workers belonging to the disadvantaged group bear substantial
signalling cost. The difference in signalling costs between groups is not due to any
unexplained group heterogeneity but discriminatory information policy of the
employer. Based on its belief about the group, an employer may not acquire
relevant information about the workers of this group, even if such information were
costless. It is shown that affirmative action policies can help in the presence of non-
convex signalling technology. Factors like co-ordination amongst workers, presence
of a ‘dynamic’ labour market and sub-group formation seem to affect the nature and
degree of discrimination.
Key Words: Discrimination, Affirmative Action, Information Acquisition, Signalling.
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2A Theory of Discrimination
based on Signalling and Strategic Information Acquisition
1. Introduction
This paper develops a “signalling” based theory of discrimination in which ,
even when information can be acquired at zero cost, employers choose to remain
ignorant about worker skills and may discriminate against some groups.
Discrimination in the labour market has been much studied by  economists as well
as non-economists. While the meaning and exact form of discrimination varies
considerably, a common understanding is that a worker belonging to a
disadvantaged group earns less than an equally skilled worker belonging to an
advantaged group. This could be due to either a discriminatory wage policy where
workers are paid different wages for the same job or a discriminatory job
assignment policy where each job carries the same wage but a worker from the
disadvantage group is assigned, on average, to a job paying less. An important
issue to be addressed is how such discriminatory policy can occur and persist in the
presence of competition and rational profit maximising employers.
The two main theories of discrimination are  taste based theory following
Becker (57) and  statistical theory following Phelps (72) and Arrow (73).  A taste-
based theory would argue that employers have a taste for discrimination and are
willing to suffer profit loss. But, as critics point out, these employers can be
competed away by profit maximising employers and in due course wages of
disadvantaged workers would be pushed up in the labour market.
Statistical theory, on the other hand, is based on the imperfect observability
of the worker’s skill or productivity. It is assumed that the employer can observe an
imperfect (noisy) signal of worker’s skill. Hence, the wage policy or the job
assignment policy would be determined by the (posterior) belief that the employer
has about the worker. But this posterior belief depends on the prior belief about the
worker’s skill. In many cases, group membership is the source of such prior beliefs.
Hence, depending on which group a worker belongs to, the employer can have
different prior beliefs and consequently different posterior beliefs about the skill
level, for the same realisation of the signal. These different prior beliefs can be self
fulfilling in many ways. To consider one case (as in Coate and Loury (93)), suppose
the skill or productivity of the worker is acquired by an investment choice of the
worker.  A worker would choose to invest in skill acquisition if the expected benefit
3outweighs the cost. The employer, given the information about skill types, would
assign the skilled worker to skill sensitive but better paying job and would assign the
unskilled worker to job paying less and requiring no skill. A wrong assignment would
mean production loss for the employer. In the absence of information about the skill
types, the employer would conduct a test and observe an imperfect signal of the
skill level, which the employer uses to update his prior belief about the worker.
Consequently, a worker’s prospect of being assigned to the better job depends to
some extent on the prior belief held by the employer. Workers in different groups
with identical cost (distribution) would face different incentives for skill acquisition
depending on the prior beliefs held by the employers. It is then possible that they
differ in their acquisitions of skill in such a way that the discriminatory beliefs held by
the employer are justified in equilibrium1.
To some extent one can extend the same criticism to these imperfect
signalling models as applied to the taste based models.  It is always beneficial to the
worker as well as the employer that the skill level is identified accurately.  This way
the employer can reduce production loss by making the right kind of assignment
and the worker can improve the expected benefit with a greater chance of getting
the appropriate job or wage. So we would expect to see both employer and the
worker striving to improve on the imperfect signal.  Suppose, it is the case that the
employer can make a small investment and can get a perfect signal of the worker’s
quality.  It would be reasonable to presume that the employer would make the
investment.  Likewise, if it were possible for the worker to signal his true skill level,
then he would possibly do so in many reasonable circumstances where the benefit
outweighs the signalling costs.  In either case group membership will cease to
matter and there will be no basis for discrimination.
We shall show, however, that discrimination is possible even in the presence
of such perfect signalling2. It turns out that signalling costs would be different for
different groups leading in turn to different incentives for the workers. Importantly,
signalling costs differ across groups not because of any unexplained heterogeneity
but because of discriminatory policy by the employer3.
                                                       
1
 We follow Coate and Loury (93) in the basic set up and denote these self fulfilling beliefs as
discriminatory equilibria.  Such equilibria also emerge when the degree of imperfections in the signal
is thought to be different for different groups. See Phelps (72). For example, it is supposed to be
noisier for minority groups.
2
 This is not to suggest that in the real world there is perfect signalling. Rather our paper aims to
extend the earlier reasoning.
3
 Spence (74) contains an early suggestion of a similar theory of discrimination where relationship
between education and ability is perceived to be different for different groups.
4We assume that an employer can observe the skill level at some cost4. In
that case, a worker’s skill level can be revealed either by his own signalling activity
or by the information gathering activity of the employer. In the former case, the
worker bears the cost where as in the latter case the employer bears the cost.  This
opens up the possibility of strategic interaction between the worker and the
employer. Each would like the other party to incur the cost.  Our paper analyses
such a strategic interaction.  It is shown that discriminatory equilibria can emerge as
a consequence.
We add another dimension to the signalling process by assuming that the
employer may have a secondary interest in the signalling activity of the worker in
addition to the revelation exercise. The cost incurred by the worker could be the
source of benefit to the employer. For example, if the worker works hard and
produces more to signal his high productivity, then the signalling activity adds to the
profit of the employer. So the employer would always prefer the worker to undertake
the signalling activity. In some cases the employer bears the cost, as he does not
expect the worker to undertake the costly signalling activity. This is where group
membership of the worker may matter. Depending on which group the worker
belongs to, the employer may have different beliefs about skill level and
consequently different strategies- whether to invest in information gathering or not.
It is shown that  when the employer believes that the proportion of skilled worker is
small for the group, the employer would prefer not to acquire information even if it
were costless to do so. Hence, workers from the disadvantaged group would have
to bear the signalling cost. This reduces the incentives of the workers belonging to
this group and consequently a smaller number of workers would choose to invest in
skill acquisition. Thus, the discriminatory beliefs of the employer are self-fulfilling5.
Paradoxically, it is the ability and the willingness of the skilled worker to
signal that leads to the discriminatory equilibrium. If it were the case that the skilled
worker would always pool with the unskilled worker, then the employer would be
better off acquiring information about the skill types. In that event, the skilled worker
gets assigned to the better job without having to incur any signalling cost.  So the
incentive to invest in skill acquisition is the same for all workers irrespective of their
group membership. This suggests that any policy intervention to eliminate
                                                       
4
 The employer can gain access to some monitoring technology by making an investment. We can
allow for indirect observability of the skill types as well. In much of the paper this cost will be taken to
be zero.
5
 Notice that discrimination takes a different meaning. There is no discriminatory wage policy or job
assignment in the equilibrium. A more detailed discussion follows in the next section.
5discrimination has to induce direct information acquisition by the employer.
Since it is unlikely that an employer’s information acquisition policy can be
monitored directly, we consider affirmative action policies designed to achieve equal
representation of the workers from the disadvantaged group in the better job. This
means that the employer has to assign a certain fraction of workers from this group
to the better job irrespective of their skill level.  This may improve the earnings of
this group but the discriminatory equilibrium is not eliminated. In fact, the incentive
of the worker to invest in skill acquisition is reduced and a still lower fraction of the
workers choose to acquire skill.  But the introductions of non-convexities in the
signalling technology- say a fixed cost of signalling- leads to a dramatic change in
the result. As an unskilled worker also has a positive probability of getting the better
job, the net benefit to a skilled worker from signalling decreases. However, because
of the fixed cost the signalling cost does not decrease in a similar fashion6. So, for
some parameter values the skilled worker does not benefit from signalling.
Anticipating this the employer is better off investing in direct information acquisition.
This leads to a non-discriminatory equilibrium and the affirmative action policy will
be redundant in equilibrium. Clearly, the higher the fixed cost the more likely is such
a situation.  It would appear that the intervention is more likely to be effective when
perceived (not real) group differences are substantial. The larger the difference, the
greater is the chance of an unskilled worker being assigned the better job due to the
affirmative action policy and the lower is the benefit from signalling by the skilled
worker.  In a related vein, we also show that co-ordination among workers of a
group can make the intervention more effective.  A skilled worker may prefer to
signal if all other skilled workers are also engaged in signalling, but he may prefer
not to do so if none of the other skilled workers signalling. When no one signals, the
employer is again forced to invest in information acquisition.
The paper explores the possibility of different labour markets or different
sectors of a labour market exhibiting different degrees of discrimination.  One would
expect that a more dynamic labour market with high turnover and public signalling
mechanisms (as in academia) would be less discriminatory than another market
where workers are stuck to a particular employer for long period and can signal their
skill only to the present employer.  As shown in the paper, this turns out to be the
case in some settings.  A high probability of separation from the current employer
                                                       
6
 Some of the later discussion relies on the presence of this fixed costs. Since most real life production
process would involve some fixed  or start up cost of one kind or another, we do think the results are
of some relevance.
6would lead the skilled worker to invest more in the public signal. The net benefit
from higher effort (and higher (private) output to the current employer) becomes
smaller. So at some stage the worker may invest only in the public signal and if the
public signal is not quite deterministic the employer again would make the
necessary investment to acquire information about skill types.
Even though racial and gender discrimination have attracted most attention,
a general theory ought to address other bases of possible discrimination. For
example a particular racial group may further be divided into different subgroups
based on class, income, neighbourhoods, language etc.  We ask how the
complexity of group identity and sub-groups affect the nature of discrimination. To
this end we draw attention to a distinction between discrimination based on
commonly observed characteristic and commonly unobservable but easily verifiable
characteristic. We suppose that while the group’s identity could be common
knowledge, subgroup’s identity need not commonly observable.   Subgroup
formation can be viewed as a process of making this characteristic common
knowledge. We argue that this can be detrimental to the welfare of the group as a
whole in some cases.
The main contribution of the paper is two-fold.  It supplements the literature
on discrimination by showing how discrimination can arise even when there is
perfect revelation of worker’s skill. The paper is closely related to previous work by
Coate and Loury (93), and  Milgrom and Oster (86). The structure of the model is
similar to the model of negative stereotypes and affirmative action by Coate and
Loury (93).  Our concept of the disadvantaged group having to incur signalling cost
is somewhat similar to the invisibility hypothesis studied by Milgrom and Oster (86).
They assume that the members of the disadvantaged group are less visible and
hence suffer from lack of promotion which renders visibility. In our model workers
from this group are less visible and hence they have to incur the signalling cost.
However, in our model, the difference in visibility is not taken as a primitive but is
the result of employer’s information acquisition policy.
From a general agency perspective, the model shows how information may
not be acquired by the employer even if it were costless.  This is in contrast to the
general presumption that valuable information will always be acquired. The strategic
information acquisition result is similar to Cremer (95)7.  His model focuses on post-
contractual work incentives of workers due to an arm’s length relationship. Our
model, in addition, also looks at how the pre-contractual human capital decisions by
7workers are affected.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the basic model is
presented. The focus is on the strategic information acquisition and signalling by the
employer and the worker respectively. Section 3 studies the incentive to acquire skill
and shows how discriminatory equilibria can emerge. Section 4 discusses the
various extensions of the model. It introduces affirmative action and analyses its
effectiveness. In  Section 5, the importance of public signals and market turnover is
analysed. Section 5 introduces the concept of active and passive discrimination and
we briefly discuss the role of sub-groups. The last section concludes with brief
comments on possible extensions and applications of the model.
2.  The Basic Model:
We consider a scenario where an employer hires a worker to work in two
interlinked production processes (markets), X and Y.  Outputs in these two markets
are denoted by X and Y.  They are temporally separated, so that the worker first
works in market X and output is realised before production begins in Y.  One
possible interpretation being that the worker first works in the shop floor (X) before
moving on to the management cadre (Y)8. A worker can be of two types- skilled and
unskilled denoted by s and u respectively. Only the worker knows his type, although
as we shall subsequently assume the employer can acquire this information.
2.1 Technology:
The two markets are quite different. Output in market X is given by
(A1) X = X0 + α t e,    t = s, u
where α is some fixed parameter with αt <1. s and u also denote the productivity
levels with s > u and e is the effort put in by the worker. It is clear that output in this
market is not very sensitive to the effort or ability of the worker.  To raise output,
effort has to increase more than proportionately.
Output in market Y is quite sensitive to the ability or productivity level. This
creates the demand for information about the types.  We take an extreme case
where production process is of two types denoted by y, y ∈ {1, 0}. Type 1
production requires that the s-type worker should be assigned to it and there is
production loss if u-type worker is assigned. Output does not depend on effort in
                                                                                                                                                              
7
 See Cremer and Khalil (93), Cremer, Khalil and Rochet (97) also.
8
 We can interpret it to be a two period relationship as well. But these two periods have to be non-
identical. The first period can be also viewed as the probationary phase.
8this market. Denoting Yt1 as the output when the t-type worker is assigned to y = 1,
we assume that
(A2) Ys1 > Yu1
2.2  Payoffs:
Wage rates are fixed and exogenous9. In market X, it is simply Wx. In market
Y if the worker is assigned y = 1, then wage is W1, W0 otherwise. In addition W1 >
W0.  Both worker and the employer are risk neutral. Worker’s payoff is given by
(A3) Ut =  Wx + E(Wy ) -e,  t = s,u
where E(Wy) is the expected income depending on the probable job assignment in
Y and e is the effort level.
The employer’s profit in market X is simply X - Wx. In market Y it depends on the
assignment. Let Vty denote the net output realised by the employer when type t
worker is assigned job y. So his overall payoff is
 (A4) V = (X-Wx) + (Vty )10
We assume that
(A5) Vg1 > Vb0 ≥ Vg0 > Vb1
Both (A3) and (A4) implicitly assume that there is no discounting, which can be
introduced without any change in results. (A5)  reflects the type-sensitivity of the
technology in Y. It also incorporates  W1 > W0. This means there is a positive
demand for type information by the employer.
2.3 Sequence
The worker and the employer take actions in the following sequence.
1. Employer decides whether to acquire information or not. We consider a
scenario where it is possible for the employer to acquire information
regarding the type of the worker if he were to make an investment ε. Our
focus is on the case where ε is small. The decision will be denoted by I, I ∈ {
1, 0 }.
2. Worker chooses e (effort) in market X, after observing  I.
3. Employer realises output X and then chooses the assignment rule y∈ {1, 0} 
for the worker in market Y .
                                                       
9
 We follow Coate and Loury (93) in focusing on earning differential due to job assignment rather
than wage levels.  Competition, wage regulation etc. can account for this.
10
 One can consider a more general payoff function V = β (X-Wx) + (1-β) (Vty - Wy). One can then
interpret β = 0 to be the case where worker’s action in X has a purely information revealing role like
standard signalling models.  Likewise a high β would suggest that the transfer aspect is more
important.
94. Payoffs are realised.
The employer has certain belief 0< π <1 that the worker is s-type.  At this
stage we are assuming that employer can commit to whatever policy chosen at
stage 1. For example he can not change it after observing output X even if that
might be in his interest.  Another interpretation (Cremer 1995) would be to make the
employer choose the information or monitoring technology at stage 1. After
observing X at stage 3, he decides whether to monitor or not. An efficient monitoring
technology would mean the employer could observe the skill of the worker
costlessly. But with an inefficient monitoring technology the cost of monitoring is too
high so that it is never optimal to monitor irrespective of the outcome in market X.
It will be convenient to label stages 2-4  as game G. If I = 0, then G is a
signalling game .  On the other hand when I = 1, G is a simple extensive form game
with perfect and complete information.  We turn to the analysis of this game G.
2.3 Information Acquisition and Signalling:
Case 1: When I = 1, the employer will always make the right assignment
resulting in a payoff of
(6) π Vs1 + (1-π) Vu0  - ε
The s-type worker gets W1 and the u-type gets W0 in market Y.
Case 2: Now suppose I = 0. If  both types choose same effort level then the
employer  assigns the worker to y ∈ {1, 0}  based on expected payoff. For example
if π is the prior belief that the worker is s-type , then the expected payoff from
assigning him to y = 1 is given by
(7) π Vs1  + (1-π) Vu1
Similarly one can find out the payoff from assigning him to y = 0. Clearly for π <πc ,
the employer would assign the worker to y=0, where πc is given by
(8) πc Vg1 + (1-πc) Vb1 = πc Vg0 + (1-πc) Vb0  .
or, πc = (Vb0  - Vb1) / [(Vg1 - Vg0)+ (Vb0 - Vb1)]
Let us consider the case when I = 0, and π < πc. The worker knows that in
the normal course, both types would be assigned y = 0 and the wage would be W0.
But the s-type worker can signal his type by producing in excess in market X. Since,
the marginal cost of production (in excess of X0 ) is lower for the s-type than the u-
type, it is possible for the s-type to separate from the u-type.
Define output level X* such that
(9) X* = X0 + α b (W1 - W0)
X* is the output level such that the b-type would be indifferent between producing X0
10
and receiving a wage of W0 in market Y , and producing X*  and receiving an wage
W1 in market Y. Recall that wage in the market X is same irrespective of the output
level11. Using (A1) and s > u, we have
(10) Wx + W0 < Wx + W1 - (X* - X0 )/αs
or, αs(W1 - W0) > (X* - X0)
This means that when faced with an uninformed employer the s-type would in fact
produce an output level X* to signal his type. This is confirmed by the following
proposition.  We shall consider sequential equilibria of this game G. (e*, y* , µ)
constitutes an equilibrium of the game if the strategy pair satisfies sequential
rationality given belief µ and the belief system µ is consistent with the strategies and
Bayes’ rule whenever applicable.  The same definition applies to the case when I =
1, except that µ  ∈ {1, 0}  in this case.
Proposition 1:
Consider G with I = 0 and π < πc . There is an equilibrium where the s-type produces
X* and u-type produces X0. The employer assigns the worker with output X ≥ X* to y
= 1 and y=0 otherwise. The out of equilibrium belief held by the employer is given
by µ (s, X < X*) = 0. Output levels lower than X* are believed to have come from the
u-type only.
Proof: The proof is standard and hence is omitted. The appendix contains a brief
sketch12.
This has an interesting implication for the incentive of the employer to make
investment in information gathering.  Notice that the unique outcome in G is
completely determined by employer’s choice of I.  When I = 1, it is given by (6) and
when I = 0, it is given by the outcome defined in Proposition 1.  The next proposition
shows that employer’s policy I is in turn determined by the prior belief π.
Proposition 2:
If  0< π < πc, given the payoffs, the employer will always choose I = 0 (even if ε = 0).
But when π > πc,  for small values of ε , the employer will choose I = 1.
Proof:
If π < πc and I = 1, then s-type will also choose an output level X0 as wage
does not depend on the output in this market. But when I = 0, the s-type would be
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 This is not essential. One can introduce bonus payment where bonus = δ(X –X0), but the bonus does
not completely compensate for the effort δu<1.
12
 One can use refinement notions (see Cho & Sobel (90)) to show that this equilibrium is unique.
11
forced to choose a higher output level X*. If they pool with the u-type, the
employer’s posterior belief is same as π and given this belief the employer would
always choose to assign the worker to job y = 0 as
π Vs1 + (1-π) Vu1  < π Vs0  + (1-π) Vu0 , for π < πc.
When the prior belief of the worker being good type is higher, 1> π > πc, for
sufficiently small ε > 0,
π Vs1 + (1-π) Vu0 - ε > π Vs1  + (1-π) Vu1  > π Vs0  + (1-π) Vu0
Since the s-type knows that it would get a higher wage irrespective of the outcome
in market X because of the second part of the inequality, he would never engage in
costly signalling activity.  []
As evident from the above proposition, unless ε is very high it does not play
any role in our model, because the employer chooses I = 0 for some groups even if
ε = 0. To avoid repetition and extra notation we shall take ε to be zero for the rest of
the paper13.. All results will hold good for small ε. First best is attainable in our model
when ε = 0. In this outcome, the s-type also chooses a zero effort level and the
employer finds out the true type. But because of strategic reasons, in certain cases
it will never be achieved. The incentive not to acquire information is very similar to
Cremer’s (95) model of arm’s length relationship. In his model, the employer prefers
not to acquire information about the worker’s type, because it increases the
incentive of the worker to improve performance in the first period and the employer
can induce him to choose higher effort at lower cost. But, in his model, a worker’s
type is due to random factors and not due to prior action by the worker. So one can
not examine how the employer’s information policy would affect the incentive of the
worker while choosing his type.  This is what we are going to examine in the next
section.
3.  Discriminatory Equilibria:
We consider a scenario where groups of workers are assigned to an
employer. All employers are alike, so the analysis will focus on a single employer.
As mentioned earlier the worker can make certain investment (at cost c) and
become a s-type. This investment decision will be denoted by m , m ∈ {1,0}. A
worker will choose to be a s-type (m = 1) if the net gain from being a s-type is
greater than the cost c. The net gain depends on how the game G, as described in
the previous section, is played.  We shall consider two racial groups b and w. Both
                                                       
13
 All results are true when ε > 0 but small. Small costs are to be interpreted in a relative fashion,
compared to the profit of the employer and the earnings of the worker.
12
groups have the same distribution of the cost c. We assume that
(A6) c is distributed according to some distribution function F over the interval [0
C]. For simplicity and ease of computation we restrict attention to uniform F.
The employer does not observe the investment decision and has beliefs about the
likelihood of a particular group worker being of s-type. These are given by πb and πw.
Throughout, high and low refer to π being greater than or less than πc.
An equilibrium will be denoted by a strategy pair (mj*(c), Ij*), j = b, w such that
(1) worker’s expected payoff is maximised given his own c and employer’s I*
(2) employer’s payoff is maximised given his beliefs πj
(3) and πj is consistent with worker’s strategy mj* and the cost distribution F.
For convenience we shall use an equivalent notion and denote an equilibrium to be
a pair of self fulfilling beliefs (πb*, πw*), where πj* is uniquely determined by mj* and
F()
πj* = F (c*), such that mj* (c ≤ c*, Ij*) = 1 and mj* (c > c*, Ij*) = 0.
Groups are ex-ante identical with exactly same F.  We can have a
discriminatory equilibrium where employer’s belief -low  πa  and high πh - is fulfilled in
equilibrium. Before we formally state it we need a couple of more conditions.  We
assume that
(A7) s ≤ s0
where s0 =  u∆W / (∆W - πcC)
Since s would affect the signalling cost, this condition guarantees that these costs
are not non-substantial and they matter. Lastly
(A8 ) C > ∆W > πc C
This condition assumes that wage differential is neither too high nor too low relative
to the cost distribution.
Proposition 3:  Given assumptions A(1)  - A(8), there exists a discriminatory
equilibrium (πb*, πw*) with πb*< πw*.
Proof:  Given the linear payoff structure and the uniform distribution, we can
construct such an equilibrium easily. Let the prior belief be such that  πb < πc < πw.
For group b, by propositions 1 and 2, the s-type worker will chose effort e* = (X*-X0)/
αs to signal his type. The net expected payoff to a worker from making an
investment c is given by (using (9) and ∆W ≡ W1 - W0 )
∆W - e* = ∆W (1-u/s)
So, a worker with c ≤ ∆W (1-u/s) will choose m =1.  This implies that for this group a
13
fraction πb* = ∆W (1-u/s)/ C will be s-type.  Given (A7), it is clear that πb* < πc.
On the other hand, πw > πc. By proposition 2, Iw* = 1 and the net expected
payoff to a s-type worker is simply ∆W. A worker with c ≤ ∆W will make the
investment implying πw* = ∆W/C. Using (A8), it is clear that πh* > πc.     []
This is not the unique equilibrium. There is another equilibrium where the employer
believes both groups to be identical and in equilibrium they will be identical.
Example 1:  Let s = 3, u = 1, α = 1/6, Vs1 = 20, Vu0 = 10, Vs0 = 8, Vu1 = 4, W1 = 10,
W0 = 4 and normalise X0 = 0. It can be checked that all the assumptions are
satisfied. The separating level of output is X* = 1 and the u-type would have to put
in an effort level eu = 6. Both groups b and w have the same uniform distribution of c
over the interval [0    16] . As stated in the previous discussion, the employer
believes that πb < πc < πw. In this example πc = 1/3. It can be checked that for group
b, only 1/4th of the total number of workers will choose m = 1 and for group w, 3/8th
of the total number of workers will choose m = 1. Hence πb = 1/4 < 1/3 < 3/8 = πw   is
a discriminatory equilibrium.
This is quite similar to the discrimination model of Coate and Loury (93).  In
their model, the employer has different prior beliefs for the two racial groups. Both
groups face a test and the employer observes an imperfect signal of their type.
Since the signal is imperfect, the posterior belief of the employer is determined to
some extent by the prior. So the group facing an adverse prior has a smaller chance
of being assigned y=1. This reduces the incentive for this group to invest and
consequently, a smaller number of workers choose m =1. This, in turn, justifies the
low prior associated with this group. In our model, a perfect but costly signal is
present (the s-type can choose higher effort in market X to reveal its type). As seen
in the previous discussion, employer’s decision to acquire information is strategic
and depends on the prior belief. He chooses not to acquire the information for the
group with a low π. So, like the Coate & Loury model, the group with adverse prior
faces reduced incentives because it is this group which would have to bear the
signalling cost. Reduced incentives lead to a smaller fraction choosing m = 1,
justifying the adverse prior14.
There may be some disagreement regarding whether this equilibrium
constitutes a  case of discrimination or not. Notice that all s-type workers get the
same wage in equilibrium irrespective of their group memberships. A s-type worker
                                                       
14
 When ε is large, one can not find pure strategy equilibrium for group h. But with mixed strategies
similar discriminatory equilibrium can be sustained.
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is always assigned y = 1 and this job carries a fixed wage.  Since the disadvantaged
group ( group b) has fewer members making the investment in skill, the average
income of this group is lower.  However, we shall consider it a form of discrimination
as prior to making the investment choice both groups are identical15 and it is the
information acquisition policy of the employer that distorts group b’s incentive and
discourages some group b workers from making the investment.
Before we turn to certain policy interventions, it is worth pointing out that
improvements in productivity in the form of a rise in s can eliminate the
discriminatory equilibrium. This will reduce the signalling cost incurred by the s-type
worker.  A subsidy on the investment cost c for the disadvantaged group will have a
similar impact. Moreover, such changes need not be permanent. In our model , a
single shock would imply that the discriminatory beliefs can not be sustained and
the only sustainable beliefs by the employer would be the non-discriminatory one.
Moreover the extent of changes in s or subsidy on c need not be large to guarantee
a non-discriminatory equilibrium πb* = πw*, irrespective of how high πw* may be. If  πb
> πc because of interventions, the only possible equilibrium is with πb* = πw* .
4. Affirmative Action
In this section we examine how affirmative action16 policies will fare in our
model context.  Affirmative action (denoted AA) policies can be result oriented as
well as process oriented. For example, equal opportunity laws would be process
oriented and proportional representation of different groups in better jobs would be
result oriented.  Since it is unlikely that government can directly influence the
information policy of the employer, we will consider policy related to outcomes. In
our context, affirmative action will require the employer to achieve proportional
representation of both groups in the better job. Throughout the paper affirmative
action would mean the following condition
(AA) λb = λw , where λ is the fraction of the group assigned to job y = 1.
 As a result, the employer will have to either assign more workers from the
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  We feel skills gap is an important aspect of discrimination. In our model, the gap is purely as a
result of wage incentives. However, it could also be a reflection of other social and cultural factors
(geographic segregation, social norms etc) which have racial dimensions. See  Loury (98),, Akerlof
(97).
16
 Affirmative actions refer to policies aimed at combating differences between groups in earnings and
employment and undoing unfair group discrimination.  See Welch (76), Lundberg (91), Coate &
Loury (93), Kim-Sau (98), Benoit (99) among others, for various models of affirmative action.
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group with adverse prior to y= 1 or assign less workers from the other group to y =
1. We shall rule out the second possibility by assuming that the disadvantaged
group is a relatively small minority17. This means the employer would assign some
u-type workers to the better job rather than wrongly assign a large number of s-type
worker to the worse job.  Even though the case where affirmative action policies
affect employer’s assignment of workers from the advantaged group can have some
interesting implications, we have chosen not to focus on them.
4.1   Discriminatory Equilibria and Affirmative Action
Introduction of (AA) does not mean that the incentives to members of the
group will improve or the discriminatory equilibrium will cease to exist. In fact, the
incentive to invest can go down for the group. Consider Example 1 discussed
earlier. In equilibrium, 1/4 of the group b workers and 3/8 of the group w workers
would be assigned the better job y=1. This however, violates condition AA. Hence
this particular discriminatory equilibrium is not feasible any longer. But that does not
necessarily imply that there is no other discriminatory equilibrium satisfying the
constraint AA. It can be shown that πb ≈ 3/1618, πw = 3/8 , Ib = 0 and Iw = 1 constitute
an equilibrium. The s-type workers from group b signal their type by choosing a
higher level of effort and are assigned y =1. The employer assigns group b  worker
with output X ≥ X* to y=1 and in addition assigns some more workers (chosen at
random) with X = X0 also  to y = 1.  Now a worker has a small chance (3/13) of
being assigned y = 1 and getting the higher wage W1 even without incurring the
cost c. Both are represented equally in the better job y = 1. But notice that the
fraction of s-type workers in group b has decreased from 1/4 to 3/16. The incentive
to choose m =1 decreases because of the positive probability of a u-type worker
being assigned y = 1. The level of effort (cost of signalling) required to signal one’s
type also decreases but it is less than the fall in the net benefit from signalling. The
group with the adverse prior gets `patronised’19 but there is no improvement in their
skill level. We can summarise this in the following proposition.
Proposition 4  :   Given any initial discriminatory equilibrium (πb*, πw* ), there always
exists , under affirmative action, another discriminatory equilibrium (πb**,πw** ) with πb**
< πb
*
 and πh** = πh*.
Proof:   Let  (πb**,πw** ) be the equilibrium under AA. It is obvious that  πw**  = πw* as
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 If Vs1 – Vs0 > Vu0 – Vu1, then the second possibility is ruled out irrespective of the group sizes.
18
 The value of πa is 0.194. The details are in the proof to the proposition 4.
19
 Coate and Loury (93) use this term to describe such equilibria. This patronisation critique has been
much discussed in the recent literature.
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employer’s policy towards this group remains unchanged given our assumption of
group b being a small minority.
Assume that the employer’s information policy towards group b also remains
unchanged. We shall show later that this is indeed the case. Since this is a
discriminatory equilibrium, the u-types from group b would be assigned to y = 1 with
a positive probability (ρ*). Using AA it can be seen that
(11) ρ* = (πw*- πb** ) / (1-πb**)
So the expected payoff to a u-type worker from this group would be
(12) Uu = ρ* W1  + (1-ρ*) W0
Let e** be the effort level chosen by the s-type worker to separate himself in the
new equilibrium.  Given (A1 & 9) it can be seen that
(13) e** = ∆W(1-ρ*) u/s
Since the s-type will be assigned to the job y= 1 with certainty , the s-type receives a
net payoff  given by
(14) Us = W1 - ∆W(1-ρ*) u/s
Hence a worker with c ≤ Us – Uu will find it worthwhile to make the investment and
choose m =1.  Since Us – Uu = ∆W(1-ρ*)(1- u/s), consistency requires that
(15) ∆W(1-ρ*)(1- u/s) = πb** C
Using the value of ρ* and the relation πw* = ∆W/C in the above equation we get a
quadratic equation with the roots given by
(16) πb** =  [1 ± { 1- 4πw (1-πw) (1-u/s)}1/2 ] / 2
The existence of real roots is guaranteed by  (1-u/s) <1 and  4πw (1-πw) ≤ 1  (note
that  max. πw (1-πw) = 1/4).
Let πl and πs denote the larger and the smaller root respectively.  It can be shown
that πl > πw  and hence can not be a candidate for our equilibrium. On the other
hand it can be verified that
0 < πs < πb* .
Hence (πb** = πs , πw*) constitute a discriminatory equilibrium. Since πs < πb* , given
this belief employer’s choice of I = 0 as assumed earlier is also optimal.  []
4.2  Non-convex signalling technology
However, there are cases where the introduction of affirmative action would
eliminate any discriminatory equilibrium. One such case is when there is some sort
of increasing returns in the production of X.  To see this , let output X be given by
(A1’) X = X0 + α t e    e ≥ e0  , t = s, u
   = X0   e < e0 .
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This means that there is a fixed cost associated with signalling. We have seen that
under affirmative action policy the gain from signalling decreases for the s-type in
the separating equilibrium. Given the fixed cost component , in certain cases the s-
type would be better off in a pooling situation. In the absence of signalling , the
employer is better off choosing information policy I = 1 for the group b as well20. The
only equilibrium consistent with this is where both groups have the same π and are
represented equally in the better job.  It is interesting to note that in equilibrium the
affirmative action policy is redundant or the equal representation constraint is non-
binding for the employer.
Proposition 5:  With the signalling technology given by (A1’), introduction of
affirmative action leads to the non-discriminatory equilibrium for sufficiently large e0.
Proof:  The details of the proof are given in the appendix. It can be shown that
there is no discriminatory equilibrium with πb**< πw**  if the following condition is
satisfied.
(17) (e0 /C) >  πw (1-πw)
As discussed earlier, following the introduction of AA21, the net benefit of signalling
goes down but the signalling cost is bounded below by e0. Hence the s-types do not
signal. In the absence of signallling, the employer is better off acquiring information
to avoid wrong assignment and production loss. []
However, in the absence of signalling a trivial equilibrium can emerge where
πb = 0. If the s-type is going to pool with the b-type , then there is no reason why any
worker would invest in being a s-type. So we can have another equilibrium where
πa* = 0 and I = 0. But it can be argued that this is not very robust. If we allow for the
possibility that a worker becomes a s-type without any investment with a small
probability γ, then I = 0 is not optimal for the employer given that it is cost less
Moreover, if workers face some uncertainty about the implementation of the
affirmative action policy  while making their investment decisions, then πa will be
bounded away from zero. We shall discuss a situation of this sort in the next section
to show how intra-group interactions may matter.
Example 2: Same as Example 1, except that e0 = 4.
So the initial  discriminatory equilibrium is given by πb* = 1/8 and πw* = 3/8.
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 Most models analyse affirmative actions in the context where equal treatment is desirable. Benoit
(99) models a situation where equal treatment is not enough to correct income inequality and
affirmative action program is necessary to overcome existing group differences.
21
 Even in the absence of AA, a sufficiently large e0 can upset the discriminatory equilibrium. But this
is same as assuming the absence of  signalling possibilities for the worker.
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With the introduction of the policy λb = λw ,in any discriminatory equilibrium with πb**
< πw*  and I = 0, the u-type will be assigned y = 1 with probability  ρ = (3/8 -  πb*)/ (1-
πb*). So in a separating equilibrium (with s-type signalling) the expected payoff to
the  s-type will be 6 (given e0 = 4). For πb = 1/8, ρ = 2/7 and the u-type’s expected
payoff is 40/7. The net gain to the s-type is 2/7, which mean πb << 1/8. But for lower
πb  the payoff to the u-type increases and that of the s-type stays same. At some
point , the s-type will be better off pooling with the u-type. Given that there is no
signalling, the employer is better off choosing I = 1 as long as π > 0.  When I =1, the
only possible equilibrium is  with  πb* = 3/8.
4.2.1    The extent of discrimination :
The condition guaranteeing non-existence of discriminatory equilibria can be
interpreted in various ways. One possible interpretation of condition  would be that
affirmative action generally would succeed when  the groups are sufficiently apart in
terms of the employer’s beliefs. Notice that (17) can be re-written to imply
πw *- πb * > πw* (1-πw*)
Since πb** < πb*, whenever a discriminatory equilibrium exists, a large (πw* - πb*)
implies that in the new equilibrium ρ* is going to be large as well. It is only then that
the u-types have a very high probability of being chosen for the better job and the s-
type has no incentive to signal.  In the absence of any signalling the employer
prefers to gather information.
We can modify the previous example to illustrate this point. Consider two
scenarios. In one, let e0 = 3, s = 6, u = 1 and everything else same as the previous
examples. The initial discriminatory equilibrium is (3/16 , 3/8). With affirmative action
the new discriminatory equilibrium is (1/16, 3/8). In the second scenario, let
everything remain same except the support of c. Let C be 12. So the initial
equilibrium is (1/4, 1/2).  The fraction of s-types in the group w has gone up and so
also the distance between the two groups. Now with affirmative action, the only
equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2).
4.2.2    Intra-group Interaction and Co-ordinated Action:
Interaction among members of the disadvantaged group generally receive
little attention in models of discrimination. However, it may matter significantly in
determining the effectiveness of affirmative action policies.  To see this, we allow
sub groups of workers to co-ordinate at stage 2, before choosing output in market
X.  It is more likely that interaction among members takes place at this stage (once
they are matched to an employer)  rather than at the beginning.  We shall assume
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that these subgroups can not write binding agreements, but can communicate freely
and the type information is known to all members of the group. So , for example , all
the s-types belonging to this group can form a subgroup and co-ordinate their
action.
Such co-ordination is not going to make a difference to the analysis of the
model in the absence of affirmative action.  But the introduction of proportional
representation policy makes a difference. Suppose there are ns s-type workers in
this group of n workers. Since the AA policy is common knowledge, these workers
know that the employer would have to assign a certain number (m) of workers to the
better job.  When the s-types signal they are assigned the better job with certainty
and the remaining (m-ns) workers are drawn from the rest of the group.  But if all the
s-type workers do not signal, then the employer will draw all m workers from the
group at random. In fact this can be an equilibrium when ns is not too small.  Given
that all (ns - 1) workers are not signalling , a particular s-type worker will not benefit
from deviating from a no-signalling action if the signalling cost outweighs the benefit
of increased chance of getting the better job.  Below we use an example to illustrate
this point.  If the s-type workers do not signal, the employer anticipating this ,will
choose to acquire information. The only equilibrium will then be the non-
discriminatory one.
To illustrate this point we use a slightly different model  of affirmative action.
We introduce some uncertainty about the implementation of this policy.  The
workers as well as the employer , while choosing their actions in period 1,  believe
that affirmative action policy will be implemented with probability p , where 0< p< 1.
The sequence of events is given below.
 
m ∈{1, 0}       with p     workers           employer
 
I ∈{1, 0}    affirmative   choose e        observes X
                    action                            and chooses
                                                           y ∈{ 1, 0}
It is a generalisation of the model in the previous section.  The assumption of non-
deterministic affirmative action can be justified on the grounds that these policies
may be subject to regular reviews and may not be in place always. Moreover, even
if the laws exist, the government’s commitment can not be taken for granted.
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Example 3:
 Consider a case where ∆W = 10, C = 12, u = 1, s = 4, e0 = 2.  We shall show that
a discriminatory equilibrium exists in the absence co-ordination among workers but
this outcome fails to be an equilibrium with co-ordination by s-type workers from
group b.
Let net outputs V be such that πc = 5/7. In the absence of any affirmative
action policy we have a discriminatory equilibrium given by πb* = 5/8 and πw* = 5/6.
Now consider a scenario where with probability p = 9/37 affirmative action may be
introduced. So there are two subgames where the workers would choose  effort in
market X. Let us label them as A and NA, depending on whether affirmative action
is to be implemented or not.  We claim that there is a discriminatory equilibrium with
πb** = 1/2 and πw** = 5/6.
To verify the claim notice that in subgame A, if all s-types signal , then the
expected payoff to a s-type worker is 10 - 2 = 8. The expected payoff to a u-type
worker is 20/3, as he will assigned to the better job with probability (5/6 - 1/2) / (1/2)
= 2/3. Given that all other s-type workers are signalling, any one s-type worker will
not find it worthwhile to deviate and pool with the u-type. In the subgame NA, again
all s-types will signal by choosing effort (∆W/s) = 2.5.  No u-type will be assigned to
the better job. So the total expected payoff of a s-type worker  is p(8) + (1-p) 7.5,
where as that of a u-type worker is 20p/3. Hence assuming that I =0 for this group, a
worker with c ≤ p(8) + (1-p) 7.5 - 20p/3 will choose to be a s-type.  Given that c is
distributed uniformly over the interval [0  12] and p = 9/37, this means that the
fraction of s-type worker for this group will be 1/2.
However, this is not an equilibrium if all the s-types could co-ordinate. If none
of the s-type worker signals in subgame A, then the expected payoff to a s-type
worker in that subgame will be 50/6.  A s-type worker does not benefit from
deviating and signalling as 8 < 50/6. So we have a complete pooling situation in
subgame A.  Now the employer knows that with some probability p there will be
pooling. Since the employer has to assign a fraction 5/6 of these to the better job,
lack of any information would mean less s-types and more b-types in the better job.
With probability 1/6 a s-type will not be assigned to the better job and a b-type’s
probability of being assigned the better job goes up by 1/6. This would lead to a
production loss in Y. The expected loss in net output would be ∆Y = (Vs1 – Vs0)/6 +
(Vu0 – Vu1)/6  . On the other hand, if the employer chooses to acquire information
this loss ∆Y will be avoided but there will be no signalling in subgame NA as well.
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The employer will loose the extra output (X* - X0)/2 (as πb = 1/2). So from the
employer’s point of view the difference in payoff would be given by
V(I = 1) - V(I=0) =  p ((Vs1 – Vs0)/6 + (Vu0 – Vu1)/6) - (1-p) (X* - X0)/2
The employer will be better off acquiring information if this term is positive. This will
be true for a range of values. One such possibility is given by Vs1 = 15, Vs0= 10 =Vu0
, Vu1 = 4.5 and α < 2/3. It can be checked that πc = 5/7 as assumed earlier. Given α,
(X* - X0) will always be less than 20/3. It can be verified that V(I=1) > V(I=0).
But if the employer chooses I = 1 for this group as well, then the only
possible outcome is the non-discriminatory equilibrium  πb** = πw** = 5/6. This
example shows that affirmative action policy need not be effective in itself unless
there some co-ordination amongst members of the disadvantaged group. It is also
interesting note that even though the affirmative action policy is likely to be
implemented with a small probability, it turns out to be effective22.
4.3    Public Signals and Turnover:
Even though our analysis was conducted in terms of a single employer, it is
consistent with the presence of several employers each with similar beliefs.
Information is assumed to flow freely between employers. Output X is publicly
observable and so is the information collected by the employer. One can argue that
employer’s information on the workers is hard information and can be used by the
worker while switching employers.  One can use a model of this kind to justify the
fixed wage structure assumed earlier. But our purpose here is different.  We are
interested in asking how the results will change if we allow X to be a private signal-
not observed by other employers.  Since wages are given and the employer will
always prefer to assign the s-type worker to the better job the private nature of the
signal does not matter. But if there is a positive probability that worker gets
separated from the employer after the production stage  X, then it matters.
As a first step let us assume that X is the only signalling variable.  The
worker gets separated from the current employer (after stage 2) with an exogenous
probability µ. X can not be observed publicly, but the hard information collected by
the employer can be used by the worker and other employers. This means group w
is not affected by this positive turnover.  For group b, the situation is quite different.
Recall that for this group π < πc, and this is the common belief. So even if a worker
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 However, it must be pointed out that the example is quite special. We do need e0 > 0 and p < 1 to
construct an example where discriminatory equilibria exist without co-ordination but fail to exist with
co-ordination amongst workers. A full formal model will have to address some aspects of
simultaneous signalling by more than one worker.
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chooses high output to signal his type, he will be assigned y = 0 by the new
employer. So the payoff to the s-type  from signalling would be given by
(20) Us = (1-µ) W1 + µW0 - e*
where e* is the equilibrium separating effort level. Note that e* will be also low
compared to the previous case depending on µ.  Assuming output X is given by
(A1), the separating output level is given by αu(1-µ)∆W, the s-type will have to put in
e* = (1-µ)∆W(u/s). The net benefit to a s-type worker will be given by
(21) Us – Uu = (1-µ) ∆W (1-u/s).
This means the fraction of s-type workers will decrease as µ increases. This is quite
similar to the observation by Milgrom and Oster (86), that the disadvantaged group
will benefit from greater bonding and lower mobility of workers.
The effect of µ can go the other way also. As in the previous section,
suppose output is given by (A1’) rather than A1. Then clearly as µ increases, the
benefit of signalling falls but the cost of signalling is bounded below by e0. So for µ
exceeding some critical value the s-type will choose to pool.  One can use the
arguments from the previous section to show that this will result in the non-
discriminatory equilibrium.
A more interesting case emerges when workers have access to other
signals- namely a public signal Z. Suppose the worker can affect the value of Z by
putting  effort f. Like e, f is also chosen prior to the separation with the employer.
Both X and Z are realised at the same time. Z does not yield any direct benefit to
the employer. We shall assume that f enters the utility function in a symmetrical
fashion. However, unlike the private signal X, Z has a stochastic nature. Otherwise
there is no reason why Z would not be chosen by the worker in the first place. We
assume that
(A9 ) Z takes two values Z = Zs  and Z = 0. For the s-type Z = Zs  with probability 
q(f), where q(f) is increasing in f, concave and 0< q(f) <1. For the u-type Z 
= 0 with certainty.
The utility to a s-type worker is given by
(22 ) U = µ ( q(f) W1 + (1-q(f))W0)  + (1-µ) W1 - e - f   for f > o and e ≥ e*,
where e* is the separating level of effort.
Note that the worker is assigned to y = 0 when Z = 0 is realised. Given that the initial
prior belief about this group πb is less than πc  , the posterior belief will also be less
than πc. This justifies the assignment y= 0 . Moreover we would like to keep the
analysis of the model exactly same as in the absence of any turnover.   The
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following assumption guarantees this
(A10 ) e* ≤  f* = argmax {q(f) W1 + (1-q(f))W0}
Now we can state the following proposition assuming A1’ and A(9)  - A(10)  to hold.
Proposition 6 :  Given any discriminatory equilibrium  with zero turnover, there
exists a µ0 such that for µ > µ0  the only equilibrium is the non-discriminatory one.
Proof:   Let µ = 0. Then using (A10)  one can show that the s-type worker will use
only the signal X and put in effort e*, where e* = ∆W (1-1/s).  He will not use the
public signal as not only does he have to incur greater cost but the probability of
getting the higher wage is also less, q(f*) < 1. So the analysis of the model is same
as before and we have a discriminatory equilibrium (πb*< πw*).
However, if µ >0, the worker will choose f> 0.  His decision to use the public
signal is independent of whether he is using X or not , although the optimal value
f*(µ) will depend on whether e* is positive. Assuming that the worker continues to
use X , the separating level of effort now will be (1-µ) ∆Wu/s. Given our
assumptions on q(f), it is easy to see that
µ ( q(f) W1 + (1-q(f))W0)  + (1-µ) W1 - e* - f*(µ) > (1-µ) W1 - e*
Since use of Z is inevitable, the private signal now plays a secondary role. The
benefit of this signal conditional on the use the public signal Z will be given by (1-
q(f))(1-µ) ∆W. This value is falling as µ rises and as a consequence f rises.  On the
other hand the cost of the private signal also falls but is bounded below by e0 . One
can use continuity arguments to show that the signalling cost will be greater than
the benefit for some values of µ ≥ µ0.  For this value of µ, the s-type worker will use
only the public signal.
 But if the s-type worker uses the public signal, employer does not benefit
directly. Of course, the employer can use the information provided by Z to assign all
those with Z = Zs to the better job y =1.  But since q(f) < 1, some good types will be
assigned to the job y = 0 leading to a production loss in market Y.  The total
expected production loss will be πb (Vs1 – Vs0) (1-µ) (1-q(f)) > 0.  Given this the
employer will prefer to acquire information at stage 1 to avoid the production loss.
Once the employer sets I = 1, workers have no incentive to use the public
signal. So both groups b and w face exactly the same incentives and in equilibrium
πb * = πw*.  []
Example 4:
Let s = 3, u = 1, e0 = 3/2, α = 1/6, W1 =10, W0 = 4 and πc = 1/3, q(f) = √f/2 , f
∈ [0  4). When µ = 0, s-type worker would choose e* = 2 as U(e* =2, f = 0) = 10 – 2
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= 8 > U(e* = 2, f>0)  and U(e* =2, f = 0) > U(e =0, f*  =9/4) = 25/4. When µ = ¼, the
worker would choose e* = 3/2 and f* = 9/64, e* = 3/2 is the separating level of effort
for X and given that with probability ¼ he will face another employer f* = 9/64 is the
optimal level of effort for Z.  This is his optimal choice since
U(e* = 3/2, f* = 9/64)= 7.2 > U(e* = 3/2, f= 0) = 7 > U(e = 0, f>0)
However, when µ = 2/3, he is better off focussing only on Z. Note that the effort
required to separate in X is still 3/2 as e* ≥ e0. Hence
U (e* = 3/2, f =0) = 4.5 < U(e* = 3/2, f* = 1) = 5.5 < U(e = 0, f* = 9/4) = 25/4
So the worker will choose only the public signal.
This would suggest that a dynamic labour market with high turnover and
worker’s ability to signal to their prospective employers would be less susceptible to
discrimination. A more traditional labour market where workers are locked into a
particular employer and there is no public signalling mechanism  would exhibit
greater discrimination.  It must be noted , however, that the above model is quite
special and even though public signals play an important role, there is no signalling
in equilibrium. This is due to our assumption that the information acquired by the
employer is hard information and is freely available to others.  Without this
assumption, the incentives of the group w workers will also change and we may see
some public signalling in equilibrium.
5. Passive Discrimination
Given that information plays a major role in our model of discrimination, one
can  make a distinction between discrimination based on a commonly verifiable but
not directly observable characteristic and discrimination based on directly
observable characteristic. Discrimination based on socio-political background and
associations (caste, religion, affiliations etc.) belongs to the former category.
Gender and racial discrimination belong to the second category. In the former
context, if the employer wishes to discriminate then he can seek information about
this variable. In the case of discrimination based on directly observable
characteristic, we can ask whether the employer would actively seek information
regarding this characteristic if it were not observable. Discrimination of either type
will be called a case of active discrimination if either the employer is actively seeking
or willing to seek information on group identifying characteristic.
If the employer is following discriminatory policy because  of direct
observability of some characteristic and will not do so if the characteristic  were
unobservable (but easily verifiable), then we shall call it a case of passive
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discrimination. Passive discrimination means that if the group characteristic is not
common knowledge then the employer will follow non-discriminatory policy. The
employer is not going to seek information on the group characteristic and then
follow a discriminatory policy. In our model, discrimination can be passive in certain
cases.
Let us consider a particular racial group which can be divided into two sub-
groups (group I and II). Subgrouping can be on the basis of class or  other socio-
political affiliations23. We also assume that these two groups have different
distributions of c so that  group II has a higher fraction πII of s-type workers. Let  πI
and πII be  such that  employer will follow a policy of I = 1 for group II and I = 0 for
group I, when group identity is common knowledge.  In other words, πI < πc and πII  >
πc.
Now, let us suppose that group information is not common knowledge and in
the sequence of actions the employer chooses whether to ask for the group
information (Y) or not (N), before stage 1.
First consider the case where group sizes are such that24 the population
average of a s-type is πp < πc.   In that case, if the employer chooses Y then this
case is exactly like our previous model of section 3. But if it chooses N, then the
employer can only have a common information policy for all, which in this case
would be I = 0. In the continuation game, since πp < πc , a policy of I = 0 implies that
all the s-type would be forced to choose e* to signal their type. Since signalling
takes place with certainty the employer is clearly better off with a policy of N and I =
0.
On the other hand, if πp > πc  then in the absence of any subgrouping the
employer would have to choose I = 1 for the whole group. But the existence of
subgruoping allows the employer to seek such information and follow a
discriminatory policy on the basis of the sub-group identity. Formally, the employer
would choose Y  and then I = 0 for group I and I = 1 for group II. The group I
workers will have to then incur the signalling cost and face a reduced incentive.
The welfare implications of these sub-grouping can go either way as the
previous two paragraphs show. Because of our assumptions of costless (or near
costless) information  and small value of α,  social welfare is maximised when the
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 Such bifurcation within racial group is an increasing phenomenon. See Wilson (80) for an
evaluation of their importance.
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 Assume that for group I, c is distributed over [0 24] and for group II, [0  12]. Let the probability of
a worker belonging to gr. I be 5/6. The probability of a group 1 worker being s-type is 1/4, where as
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employer follows a uniform policy of I = 1 and groups do not have to engage in
costly signalling. But this does not mean that any discriminatory policy is dominated
by a uniform policy in welfare terms. For example, a policy of I = 0 for all  is
dominated by a discriminatory policy  where at least one group does not have to
signal. So sub-group formation has a positive impact on group’s welfare when πp <
πc and this impact is reversed when πp > πc . This suggests that if the elite (groupII)
amongst the disadvantaged group are sizeable to influence the overall policy
towards the whole group, then formation of an elite sub-group within the group
works to the detriment of the whole group.
This  also has interesting general implications for group formations and their
sizes in cases where groups are formed in a conscious fashion (clubs, associations
etc.)25. A group, which is likely to receive favourable treatment (group II) in a
discriminatory policy, has to worry about its size too. Even with a high π, a small size
may not be enough to ensure benefits of a discriminatory policy.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that there are situations where employers may prefer not to
acquire information directly even if they are costless purely because of strategic
reasons.  By committing not to acquire direct information about the skill type of the
worker, an employer induces the skilled worker to signal his type by engaging in
costly production enhancement (to the benefit of the employer).   However, this non-
acquisition policy by the employer can work only when the prior probability of the
worker being skilled is not too high.  When the prior belief about a worker being
good is high the employer is better off acquiring the information  and the worker as
consequence does not have to engage in costly signalling.  Hence the prior beliefs
of the employer play an important role  in shaping the incentives of the workers. We
have shown how discriminatory beliefs about two ex-ante homogenous groups   can
lead to a discriminatory equilibrium.  The paper’s contribution to the literature on
discrimination lies in the demonstration of fact that such equilibria exist even when
there is free information available about the skill types.
The nature of the signalling technology plays an important role in
determining the effectiveness of affirmative action policies and  we do believe that
most real life production process would have a fixed cost. So the analysis of section
4 is quite relevant. Co-ordination amongst worker of the disadvantaged group
deserve some attention. It is not clear whether it can yield an empirically testable
                                                                                                                                                              
for group II it is 1/2. For the population as a whole πp = 7/24 < 1/3.
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proposition, but casual empiricism would suggest that it has a role to play in any
discriminatory situation. Our analysis also shows that the issue of sub-groups or
within group bifurcation is quite important in shaping the discriminatory policy
towards the whole group.  Despite  the oversimplified structure, our model has
shown that more dynamic labour markets will have less discrimination. This again
would seem to weigh well with the real world.
At a more general level, this paper has two features, which are not standard
in agency models.  It is normally believed that information is valuable, so free
information will always be acquired. In our model, in some sense information is still
valuable but the employers would prefer not to acquire it.26 This is not surprising as
in game contexts players can sometimes do better by remaining uninformed .
Agency models where similar strategic considerations are present can share the
same result.  The second point relates to the nature of signalling.  Many models
share the feature of costly signals , but  do not address the possibility of the this
cost being someone else’s benefit.  We believe, this possibility can arise in many
social situations.  This may be important in welfare terms because in such cases
socially wasteful signalling can take place27. Our model is an extreme case with
costless information  and full separation.  Hence too much should not be made out
of the result but this issue deserves more attention than it has received.
The model has many restrictive features. Information has an all or nothing
character. Moreover, the model is not consistent with high information cost (large ε).
One can however address these two issues in a more general set up where the
quality of information would depend on the amount of investment made by the
employer and this investment cost varies. Our model captures one end of the
spectrum where full information is available at no cost.
Lastly, the model has many other potential areas of applications. In the study
of organisational structures and incentives, direct information acquisition becomes a
function of the given organisational structure rather than the employer’s strategy.
For example, in small firm information flows easily, so a good type worker need not
have to engage in costly signalling28. A large firm on the other hand would resemble
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 See Basu (89) on related issues like the optimal size of associations.
26
 In equilibrium there is no loss of information, good types are always assigned the right job.
27
 Note that even if the signalling variable does not enhance productivity, it need not be socially
wasteful if  there is no other way to screen the good types. But in our model since information can be
obtained rather cheaply, even though work effort (the signalling variable) enhances production, it is
socially wasteful.
28
 The influence cost model of Milgrom and Roberts (88 ) does address similar issues. See Cremer
(95) also.
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a market where the information related to skill type of the workers would be difficult
to acquire.
One could address similar issues in the context of law and economics. our
model can be adapted to study the question of the ‘burden of proof’ and its
implications for incentives of the individuals.  Of course, legal scholars would point
towards the irrelevance of group information29 and the presence of a universal law
of “ presumed innocent unless proved otherwise”.  But in many semi-judicial set up
these two features might be absent and one can look at how different rules affect
the compliance incentives .
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Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 1
                                                         (W1 -e,Vg1 )
                         ∆x                   y=1
      π(g)                                   y=0
                                                        (W0 -e,Vg0 )
    worker                   employer        (W1 -e,Vb1 )
                                                  y=1
       π(b)             ∆x                     y=0
                                                       (W0 -e,Vb0 )
                The Signalling Game
Proof: It is easy to verify that the strategies and belief described in the proposition
constitute an equilibrium. Given employer’s strategy,  good type worker is better off
playing his equilibrium strategy because,
U = w + W0  < w - (X*-X0)/δg + W1
From condition D6,  it is clear that the bad type has no incentive to deviate either.
Likewise, given the beliefs as specified by µ, employer’s strategy is also optimal. In
addition it can be shown that the belief structure do satisfy the divinity criterion.
Consider any deviation to X<X*. Let ρ = ρ(1,X;µ) denote the probability that
the employer would assign the worker to job 1. The good type would deviate to such
an output level iff
ρW1 + (1-ρ) W0 - (X-X0)/δg  >  W1 -(X*-X0)/δg
or ρ > 1-  (X*-X) /δg(W1-W0)
Let Pg be the set of such ρ such that the good type find it worth deviating.
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Similarly, the bad type would consider deviating to X iff
ρW1 + (1-ρ) W0 - (X-X0)/δb  > W0
or, ρ > 1- (X* - X)/δb(W1-W0)
This would give us the set Pb , the set of ρ such that the bad type would deviate.
Since b<g, it can be easily seen that Pg ⊆ Pb. This would mean for any possible
response of the employer if the good type finds it worth deviating so does the bad
type. This justifies the out of equilibrium belief held by the employer. It can also be
verified that this is the only equilibrium with such a property.        
Proof of Proposition 5:
Let (πb*,πw*) be the initial equilibrium. Depending on the value of e0 , the s-type
chooses either e0 or e* as defined in Proposition 3, e* = ∆Wu/s. Let (πb**,πw** ) be the
new equilibrium under affirmative action. For the proposition to hold it must be the
case that e0 > e**, where e** is the effort put in by the s-type in the new equilibrium (
as defined by 13). So we have to consider two cases.
Case I:  e0 ≥ e*.
By ( 15 ), it must be the case that,
(17) W1 - e0 - W0 -ρ* ∆W = πb** C
(1-ρ*)∆W - e0 = πb** C
or, ∆W (1-πw*) - e0 (1- πb **) = πb** (1-πb**)C,
Solving this we get,
(18) πb** = [d ± √{d2 - 4(1-πw*)πw* + 4e0 /C}] / 2
where d = 1- (e0/C).
Like before, it can be shown that real roots exist. The larger of the two roots is
greater than πw , so it can not be part of a discriminatory equilibrium. So we focus on
the smaller of the two roots.
For an equilibrium to exist it must be the case that πb**  > 0. But using (18), it can be
shown that  πb**  < 0 iff
(19) (e0 /C) >  πw (1-πw)
 So, a large e0 with e 0 >πw* (1-πw*)C  would mean there is no πb**  satisfying πw* >
πb** > 0.
Case II:   e0 < e*. This case is exactly similar the previous case except that we have
to see whether condition (19) guarantees that there is no other  πb** > 0 such that
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e** > e0 .  Suppose such a πb** exists and e**> e0. Then it must be true that
[(1-πw) ∆W b / (1-πb**) s] > e0
where πb** is given by  (16 ). After some manipulation it can be shown that the
above inequality is true iff
((1-πw) πw ) b) / ((1-πb**)s)  > (e0/C).
However, given (19) it must be the case that
((1-πb**)s) < b
or, ((1-πw) πw )  > b/s  , using the value of πb** from (16)
or, e0/C  > b/s    using (19)
Since C > ∆W, this condition implies that e0 > ∆W/s, which is violated by our
assumption that e0 < e*= ∆W b /s.
Hence , condition (19) implies that there is no discriminatory equilibrium with πb** > 0
under affirmative action.      []
